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JOINT STATE-OSD MEMORANDUM CONCERNING 
PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA AND THE CRITERIA OF PRD-13 
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A. THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 
Criterion Met: Yes 
The civil war in Rwanda has displaced one million people 
from the northern portion of the country, and only massive 
humanitarian assistance (estimated at $100 million this year) 
has prevented widespread famine. The war, an outgrowth of 
longstanding ethnic conflict between majority Hutus and 
minority Tutsis, has produced thousands of military and 
civilian casualties and sparked further ethnic violence, with 
the continuing threat of ethnic massacres -- a recurring 
problem in the region. These conditions clearly qualify as a. 
humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with 
violence and the threat of future violence. 
B. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING 
WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS 
Criterion Met: Yes, but an international consensus does 
not exist yet on the specific means required to resolve the 
problem 
The UN, the OAU, and several regional and Western powers 
have displayed a common interest in resolving this problem, 
through both multilateral diplomatic means and through 
participation in multinational military observer missions. The 
OAU and Tanzania have sponsored year-long peace talks, with the 
UN, u.s., France, Belgi~m, Germany, and neighboring African 
countries participating as active observers. The UN recently 
approved a Rwanda/Uganda border-monitoring force and is 
studying-further action, and the OAU has fielded a Neutral 




- 2 - . , =n 
;' -lr • • ; ,~ ;,r:~ 
Although an international community of interest exists 
regarding the need for a positive resolution to the civil war, 
a consensus still needs to be developed among members of the UN 
Security Council and the broader international community about 
the specific means to accomplish that objective. In addition, 
countries which have been actively involved in the peace 
process have differing approaches to the problem. For 
ins,tance, France supports an assess~d UN force but is unwilling 
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contribute troops, and several African countries are willing to 
contribute troops, but may require payment at UN reimbursement 
rates. 
C. CLEAR OBJECTIVES, UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION'S CHARACTER 
Criterion Met: Probably, if the mission and objectives are 
well-defined in the peace accord and approving resolution. 
As currently envisioned, the proposed Neutral International 
Force (NIF) would fit a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping 
model, assuming the force is blue-helmeted. 
o Both sides have requested and consented to the force 
o A ceasefire is in place and has been holding since March 
o Hostilities have been suspended and the parties are 
already separated by a buffer zone monitored by the NMOG 
The primary mandate of the NIF would be to assure 
implementation of the peace accord, which is expected to be 
signed on August 4. The two sides expect the force to keep the 
parties apart, supervise cantonment and disarmament of troops, 
store heavy equipment, and oversee force integration and 
demobilization. 
If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became 
necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or 
resources to respond adequately. 
If the operation were not blue-helmeted, it is not clear 
that all parties would consent or that peace could be 
maintained. This could. significantly alter the proposed force 
objectives and the character of the mission. 
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D. MEANS AVAILABLE 
Criterion Met: No, not at this time 
While it might be possible to gain adequate financial and 
troop support for a Rwandan peacekeeping mis.sion, the means are 
not clearly available at this point. Generating them from the 
international community would require a significant investment 
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The two sides have been discussing an international force 
of about 2,500 men. The estimated.cost of such a force, at UN 
reimbursement rates, would be roughly $37 million for one 
year. Assuming an assessed UN operation, no financial 
resources currently exist to pay the U.S. assessment; our only 
option would be to increase our arrears. (In addition, goods 
and services could be made available through the UN 
Participation Act.) Due to its own financial constraints, the 
Russian Government seems opposed to an assessed UN peacekeeping 
operation in Rwanda. 
Russian officials have suggested funding the force through 
voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established, 
it is unclear who would contribute and in what amounts. France 
favors a UN assessed operation and has said that it would be 
unable to contribute to a voluntary·· fund, although this 
position could change if France determines that an assessed 
operation cannot win the required votes in the Security 
Council. Belgium has indicated a willingness to contribute 
toward troop costs, but no specific amount has been promised. 
Concerned regional countries have no money, and Japan and other 
wealthy nations have few interests in Rwanda. 
To provide assistance to a non-assessed operation, we might 
tap FY-93 fallout FMF funds, if ·available; however, there will 
be numerous claimants for these scarce funds. In addition, we 
might be able to move funds into the non-assessed security 
assistance peacekeeping account utilizing FAA transfer 
authority. Further, if there are funds available in DoD, it 
might be possible to provide commitments in kind (goods, 
services, and personnel). 
The availability of funding would directly affect the 
likelihood of attracting necessary force contributions. The 
OAU already has a small contingent in Rwanda, which they plan 
to expand to 240 men. However, A-~~.~~.-~:.\n~~na~t~i~o\t~t\ay not want to 
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contribute additional troops unless they are reimbursed at UN 
rates, and it would be difficult to raise sufficient voluntary 
funds to provide more than "at cost" reimbursement. At 
present, aside from the African countries participating or 
expected to participate in the NMOG, only Canada has expressed 
an interest in contributing troops in Rwanda. Qther possible 
sources of troops still need to be examined. 
were We are currently examining optl.ofiS .. or a 
more modest PKO. A small assessed· operation might be more 
acceptable to the Russians while not adding significantly to 
u.s. arrears. Alternatively, it would be easier to raise 
voluntary funds for such an operation. 
Whatever the cost of the peacekeeping mission, it must be 
weighed against the cost of doing nothing. Estimates for 
humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone exceed 
$100 million, with the U.S. having already contributed or 
pledged· over $34 million. A successful peacekeeping operation 
would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly 
reducing current humanitarian relief costs and obviating the 
need for future relief. 
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